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Helen Endre*

Legal Regulation of Sustainable
Development in Australia:

Politics, Economics or Ethics?
Government regulation of the environment is itself a growth
industry of government institutions. The immediate concern of lawyers
dealing with environmental laws and regulatory mechanisms is to analyze whether environmental rulemakers have the capacity to impose
behavior-regulating requirements upon their clients. Beyond this immediate analytical concern, lawyers are increasingly confronting the question
of whether governments should be involved in environmental regulation.
Because this normative aspect of environmental regulation has become a
preoccupation of citizens, it has also become a pre-occupation of politicians; not only at the local and
national level, but also as part of the lan1
guage of the global economy.
The United Nations has played an important role in placing environmental concerns on the international and national agenda. In 1983, the
United Nations appointed the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) under the Chairmanship of the then Prime Minister of Norway, Gro Harlem Brundtland. The United Nations wanted the
WCED to examine the nexus between environmental issues and economic
development issues. 2 The United Nations was concerned that conservation and preservation of the environment were no longer matters that each
country could effectively deal with on a parochial basis. 3 Spill-over effects
of environmental damage to neighboring nations caused by transbound* Helen Endre, Lecturer-in-Law, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia; Barrister and Solicitor, South Australia; Solicitor, New South Wales; Barrister, Queensland; Barrister, England and Wales. I have profited greatly from the comments on draft
material made by Professor Alan Fogg of the University of Queensland and the encouragement of my colleague, Dr. Razeen Sappideen.
1. In Australia, the most publicised judicial declaration that Australia could not remain
isolated and parochial in relation to issues that touch upon human life and in particular, environmental concerns, was Justice Murphy of the High Court of Australia in Tasmania v. The
Commonwealth vol 158 Commonwealth Law Reports, page 1 (1983). Id. at 733-34.
"The preservation of the world's heritage must not be looked at in isolation but as part of the
co-operation between nations which is calculated to achieve intellectual and moral solidarity
of mankind ... protecting the workd's cultural and natural heritage and thus fostering the
intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind, in promoting the elimination of war, advances
the formost object of international relations."
2. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), Our Common Future,
6-8 (1987).
3. Id. at 2-8.
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ary air and water pollution were seen by the global community and the
United Nations as examples of issues that would require international
cooperation. The WCED completed a report called "Our Common
Future" in 1987. In its report, the WCED proposed governments should
form policies to ensure sustainable development. 4 The WCED explicitly
linked economic and ecological considerations and added a moral dimension to its proposal by recommending that a right of individuals to sustainable development policies be
enshrined within an international treaty
5
as a fundamental human right.
The WCED report has sparked increasing international interest in
sustainable development in both populist and political discourse. The
report has emphasized a growing belief in the idea that social, political
and economic issues are inseparable from environmental issues by reinforcing the belief that all manner of human endeavor are connected
regardless of political differences. 6 The perception that ecological and
social issues, together with the legal forces that influence and direct these
issues, are inseparable internationally, lead to the WCED recommendation
for an international convention that would place environmental concerns
within the vocabulary of human rights. No such international treaty has
been struck yet, although environmental problems that transcend purely
local concern continue to be the focus of intense international publicity as
newspaper reports continue to show the world the devastating human
cost of environmental accidents. The Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster in
the Soviet Ukraine of 1986 affected the economic viability of large sections
of the European and United Kingdom agricultural industries with more
than 20 countries registering high radioactivity levels. Yet there was no
treaty between these countries and the U.S.S.R. allowing tort liability
claims. 7 The Sandoz chemical spill into the Rhine River in 1989 with its
consequent damage to fish population and drinking water for some of the
most heavily populated areas of Europe provided further evidence of the
need for international cooperation on environmental matters, 8 as the
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 334,348. The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
in Brazil considered an action plan for sustainable development goals. T. Starrs, 16 Ecology
Law Quarterly 604 (1989) (book review of Our Common Future by the United Nations World
Commission on Environment and Development, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press,
1987).
6. Id. at 4. See also B. Commoner, The Closing Circle; Nature, Man & Technology, (1971).
7. Chemobyl: Law and Communication, (P. Sands ed., 1988). In the United Kingdom, two
hundred farms remained closed during 1990 because of rainfall shortly after the incident
affecting their produce. In Finland, 95 percent of Laplanders' reindeer were unfit for consumption after eating vegetation affected by nuclear radiation. S. Khan & L. S. Spedding,
Environmental Diplomacy, 18 International Business Lawyer 473,475 (1990).
8. Id. The effect of the chemicals in the River Rhine was to kill off or contaminate the entire
fish population of the eight hundred kilometer waterway between Basel and Rosterdam.
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Union Carbide gas leak in Bhopal also demonstrated. 9 Regional disasters
indicate that the ever-increasing internationalization of commercial transactions brings with it the question of how each country ought to ensure
that different environmental standards benefit the economically weaker
nations. Each nation must also address the equity issues of its own internal environmental practices with new insights that take on board the panoply of scientific, economic and ethical concerns.
In Australia, sustainable development has become a policy objective of the federal government at a time of economic recession and changing political patterns. The Australian federal government began to
participate in the sustainable development debate in 1989 when the Prime
Minister announced that all federal government decisions1 ° would be
guided by three policy principles that aimed to ensure sustainable development." In 1990, the Federal government released a discussion paper
through the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet called "Ecologically Sustainable Development." 12 This paper provided the launching
ground for ongoing policy initiatives by the Australian government
throughout 1991. The government is pursuing the policy of sustainable
development within the economic vocabulary of "cost benefit analysis"
and "best available technology.' 3 Concomitant with the government's
utilitarian approach the government is also seeking to incorporate prima
facie antithetical social objectives of equality and concern for future gener9. For a description of the Bhopal incident of 1984 and its implications for ethical decisionmaking within corporations see M. Velasquez, Business Ethics, 3-6 (1988).
10. Australia has nine separate legal jurisdictions; the Federal level, six States and two
mainland territories, each with its own courts and parliament. The federal constitution,
known as the Commonwealth Constitution, gives the federal parliament specific, enumerated
powers under which it may exclusively or jointly with the States, pass legislation. All other
(unenumerated) legislative powers reside in the state and territory legislatures. There is no
specific commonwealth constitutional head of power giving capacity to the federal parliament to pass environmental legislation, but the federal parliament has effectively done so
under other Commonwealth constitutional heads of power, namely: external affairs
(s.51(xxix), interstate and overseas trade and commerce (s.51(i)), the defence power (s.57(v)),
the corporations power (s.51(xx), the taxation power (s.51(ii)), and the grants power (s.96).
These Commonwealth Constitutional powers give the Australian Federal Parliament power
to make laws with respect to..." the enumerated heads of power mentioned above. The federal government has been able to effect environmental regulation if that regulation is a necessary component of a "law with respect to..." one of the commonwealth's enumerated
powers.
11. These were later reproduced with minor amendment in the appendix to the Resources
Assessment Commission Act 1989 (Commonwealth), supranote 22, at Appendix.
Commonwealth Discussion Paper, Ecologically Sustainable Development, (ESD), Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, (Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra
Australia, 1990).
12. Commonwealth Discussion Paper, Ecologically Sustainable Development, (ESD),
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, (Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra Australia, 1990).
13. Id. at 15-19.
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ations.14 To this mixture of utilitarian and equity perspectives, the government also seeks to incorporate a general deregulatory thrust into its
proposals for an environment strategy. This approach seeks to placate the
neoliberal and public choice theorists' suspicions of government regulation of individual behavior. The result is a definition of sustainable development that has the appearance of a cross-referencing of different
philosophical and cultural values. Until now, these values have been portrayed as mutually opposing, because the practical outcomes have been
antithetical to one another.
This article uses the Australian federal government's 1990 discussion paper on ecologically sustainable development to illustrate the effects
of juxtaposing economic rationalism and environmental ethics upon government policy proposals for environmental regulation. Part I examines
the normative positions of environmentalism and developmentalism in
Australia and the economic and political positions from which they are
derived. Part II considers the convergence of these two approaches in the
Australian federal government's legislative and policy instruments which
seek to ensure sustainable development. These opposing ideologies are
placed within the contemporary Australian political and economic context which is strongly influenced by libertarian liberalism. Liberalism of
the 1980s and 1990s seeks to deregulate values of liberty and choice of, and
for, the individual citizen and apply the market economics approach to
environmental regulation. Somewhat surprisingly, despite the government's laissez-faire approach, a dimension of equity or distribute justice
has also been incorporated as part of the Government's policy objectives
for sustainable development. Part III suggests that environmental regulation, by placing different and competing normative positions on equal
footing, creates a mixture of values. These competing values fail to provide a functional environmental strategy. Part IV suggests that whether a
national environmental strategy is coherent and functional depends ultimately upon which values are prioritized.1 5 In other words, governments
must take the political risk to rank values.
14. Classical utilitarianism was formulated in the 1700s by Jeremy Bentham, who said that
"nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure... The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes so for the foundation
of that system, the object of which is to near the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and
law", in An Introduction to the Principles and Morals and Legislation, (Burns & Hart eds.
1970). See also Bentham's Theory of Legislation 3-5, (C.M. Atkinson ed, 1914). Original
Bentham utilitarianism has evolved since the 1970s into the law and economics, school of
jurisprudence. Contemporary utilitarianism converts the happiness and pain principles into
the economic equation of willingness to pay for a particular outcome. See R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd ed. 1986).
15. W. Gormley, Human Rights and Environment: The Need for International Co-operation (1976) said: "The clash between the need to conserve regources and to preserve existing
...
life.., must, regrettably, compete with the requirements of development. It is essential
that this "head on clash" not be minimized because of the interest of the world community
in both (environmental) "protection" and (economic) "development."
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A ceaseless balancing act of values provides no real solution
whilst the problem continues to be defined within political and economic
terms, rather than the ecological imperatives being placed as the primary
concern. The lack of consistent legal standards by which to measure the
relative merits of competing interests means environmental issues are
dealt with as ad-hoc political decisions that are guided by economics, not
ecology. The balancing of economic against noneconomic interests,
present day costs and benefits against consequences upon future generations, and individualism against collective interests must eventually
evolve to a choice between values if sustainable development is to acquire
a meaning beyond mere rhetoric. This choice must also be capable of actualization in a flexible way that is able to respond to the unending variety of
environmental problem situations.
PART I DUALISM AND THE MORAL
CONCERNS OF THE ENVIRONMENT DEBATE
For much of the last 20 years, debate over the environment in
Australia has been portrayed within the vocabulary of dualism of environmentalism and developmentalism. Environmentalists advocated environmental controls and were considered by their opponents to be
advocates of a steady state economy. 16 However, environmentalists
argued that the purpose of environmental regulation was to affirm the coldegradation as evilective morality of a society which saw environmental 17
dence of society's failure to live up to its moral ideals.
On the other side were the developmentalists. The developmentalists justified resource development as the means for national and local
economic growth. Their assumption was that environmental problems
arose out of inefficient use of resources. Thus, environmental problems
could be addressed by industrial efficiency and prosperity. 18 While both
views have their own inherent moral, political and economic assumptions, these assumptions were rarely aired as part of the debate.19
Political responses to this history of dualism did little more than
mirror it. Politicians were either for or against the environmentalists and
therefore for or against the developmentalists. During the 1970s and early
1980s, which were relatively good economic times in Australia, environmentalists had little incontrovertible empirical evidence to support their
16. The seminal literature on "economics as if people mattered" is E. Schumacher, Small is
Beautiful (1974).
17. R. Andrews, Cost Benefit Analysis as Regulatory Reform in Cost Benefit Analysis and
Environmental Regulations: Politics, Ethics, and Methods, D. Schwartzman, R.Liroff and K.
Croke, eds., Washington, The Conservation Foundation, 107, 112, 1982) cited in M. Sagoff,
Rationality in Environmental Law, 14 Ecology Law Quarterly 265-26 (1987).
18. W. Baxter, People or Penguins? The Case for Optimal Pollution (1974).
19. The unspoken assumptions behind different positions in the environmental debate has
been a phenomena observed also in the United Kingdom. See K. Milton, InterpretingEnvironmental Policy: A Social Scientific Approach, 18 Journal of Law and Society 4 (1991).
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urgings. Consequently, environmentalists were classified by vocal developmentalists as a (mostly) urban interest group who had no real grasp of
the resource and conservation problems in Australia.
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, it was clear that environmentalism of some form was here to stay as a political force in Australia.
Environmental concerns moved from left-wing politics into the middle
and right. This was due to a variety of causes of environmental degradation including soil degradation resulting from decades of pastoral mismanagement, salination of vast tracts of land along the Murray River
which had hitherto been rich agricultural areas, 20 and air pollution and
effluent problems in the major cities. The warmest decade on record convinced policy makers that Australia could not remain in comfortable isolation from environmental effects such as global warming. 2 1 It was clear
that certain types of environmental practices if continued could cause permanent economic disadvantages. The search for a middle ground was on
to satisfy the political forces behind the developmentalists. Naturally, the
middle ground needed to be within the economic model of Western capitalism. But, most importantly the middle ground needed to be committed
to more appropriate behavior toward the environment and resources if
the problems of environmental damage due to misuse of resources were to
be taken seriously.
PART II AUSTRALIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
APPROACHES TO SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

In Australia, the contemporary search for rapprochementat the federal government level can be identified in both legislative and policy
mechanisms. Both the legislative and policy initiatives of the federal government show that the government has recognized and incorporated concerns that had been labeled as environmental and developmental. In 1989,
Parliament set up the Commonwealth Resource Assessment Commission
to advise the commonwealth government on resource issues that the
Prime Minister referred to the Commission. 22 The Parliament incorporated the "Policy Principles for Resolving Competing Claims for the Use
of Resources" that had been announced in 1989 in the enabling legislation
for the Resource Assessment Commission. These principles dictate that:

20. The Murray River flows through three states of Australia and plays a critical role in
allowing agricultural uses in otherwise arid and semi-arid regions as it is the only waterway
in those regions.
21. See, for example, Schneider, The Green House Effect: Science and Policy, 243 Science 771
(1989).
22. Resource Assessment Commission Act, No. 94 (1989) (Commonwealth of Australia).
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1. There should be an integrated approach to conservation
(including all environmental and ecological considerations)
and development by taking both conservation (including all
environmental and ecological considerations) and development aspects into account at an early stage.
2. Resource use decisions should seek to optimize the net benefits to the community from the nation's resources, having
regard to efficiency of resource use, environmental considerations, ecological integrity and sustainability, ecosystem integrity and sustainability, the sustainability of any development,
and an equitable distribution of the return on resources.
3. Commonwealth decisions, policies and management regimes
may provide for additional uses that are compatible with the
primary purpose values for the area, recognizing that in some
cases both conservation (including all environmental and ecological considerations) and development interests can be
accommodated concurrently or sequentially, and, in other
cases, choices must
23 be made between alternative uses or combinations of uses.
By balancing competing values, these policy principles suggest
that the Australian federal government is incorporating economic and
social considerations into its definition of sustainable development. However, the values identified have been categorized within the already-existing dualist vocabulary. Environmentalism includes "all environmental
and ecological considerations." Developmentalism draws upon the economic theory of "optimis(ing) the net benefits" based on "efficiency"
models of government regulation. After "nature" and "profit" have been
addressed, the collective good is addressed by ensuring that resource use
decisions result in what is vaguely
described as an "equitable distribution
"2 4 of the return on resources.
In mid-1990, the federal government initiated a wider debate
upon the meaning and effect of sustainable development by releasing a
discussion paper titled "Ecologically Sustainable Development." 25 This
document considered a variety of practical methods to assess environmental effects of resource use. More fundamentally, it has drawn up a
variety of normative rationales used to justify the role of government in
ordering the lives of individuals. In the discussion paper, the government
23. Id. at Schedule 1.
24. Thus far, the Resource Assessment Commission has released reports upon mining at
Coronation Hill in the Kakadu National Park, Northern Territory (Report of the Resource
Assessment Commission into the Kakadu Conservation Zone, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, Australia 1991) and Australia's Forest and Timber Resources (Report
of the Resource Assessment Commission into Australia's Forest and Timber Industry, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, Australia, 1991).
25. ESD, supra note 12.
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stated that the goal of government is to ensure the "improvement of the
community standard of living.., viewed in a broad sense of (not only)
income levels or the consumption of goods and services (but also) the
environment, social justice, and personal freedoms." 26 Environmental and
economic goals are to be linked to "take count of the Government's social
justice policies and Australia's place in the world." 27
Against this philosophy of promoting an aggregate good, termed
within the paper as "equality of opportunity and social justice for all Australians",2 8it pitches the liberal model of individual freedom. The classical
liberal model is based upon the normative philosophy that each individual must be free from government regulation so that she or he may make
unfettered choices about her or his (economic) behavior. The discussion
paper's authors say that "in a democratic society, there is the issue of how
much (or how little) regulation of or intervention in peoples lives is appropriate." 29 The authors do not attempt to specifically address these philosophical apposites. They simply assert that the primary goal of
government is to "set[ting] acceptable standards in consultation with
other levels of government and other groups in the community", to ensure
that the principles of ecologically sustainable development are applied to
"all areas of economic and environmental decisionmaking, from those
30
made by individuals to those made by governments."
Like the 1987 World Commission's Report on Environment and
Development, the two federal government initiatives represent more than
a statement upon ecology and resources and development. These initiatives represent normative positions that seek to bring economic and political perspectives within one broader rationale encompassed by the term
"sustainable development." 31 The distinct underlying philosophical positions of sustainable development are not clearly articulated, but remain as
mostly unspoken presuppositions that represent arguments from both the
environmentalists view and the developmentalists. The outcome of this
conjunction of moral purposes will be examined later when canvassing
the recommendation of the first report of the Resource Assessment Commission.32 To understand the extent of the philosophical debate, it is first
necessary to understand the fundamental values that underscore these
disparate philosophical positions.

26. Id. at 1.
27. Id. at 2.
28. Id. at 27.
29. Id. at 27.
30. Id. at 10-11.
31. For a history of the term "sustainable development", see E. Barbier, The Concept of SustainableEconomic Development, 14 Environmental Conservation 102 (1987).
32. See infra notes 83, 84 and 87 and accompanying text.
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PART III THE PHILOSOPHICAL
POSITIONS BEHIND THE PROPOSALS
Five options for government policy and legislative changes are
identified in the federal government's discussion paper on ecologically
sustainable development:
1. improvement in market operation;
2. direct environmental regulation;
3. better information and analysis;
4. research and development;
33
5. public education.
Of these, market-based measures were most emphasized. Using
the market place as the engine room of change in environmental resources
use, the authors suggested that price-based measures and rights-based
measures would be the most effective means of implementing improvements in market operation: "[Miarket-based measures.., change the relative returns on activities that are environmentally benign and those that
are environmentally damaging. Or they may create efficient markets
where none presently exists. Individuals and firms are then left to make
their own decisions about what measures they will take to respond... "34
Both price-based and rights-based measures are mechanisms founded
upon the basis of driving home the cost of environmental damage to the
end-user on the principal of polluter pays. The polluter may be either the
producer or the consumer. Price-based measures such as charges and subsidies have been suggested by environmental economists throughout the
1980s as incentives for long-term resource management. Environmental
costs and benefits which consequently work to alter the ultimate price of
the product are internalized. 35 Other incentives include royalties, taxes on
resource use, charges on pollution, noncompliance fees, and compulsory
insurance to compensate the victims of environmental damage. The discussion paper proposes a valuation of environmental assets that includes
"ecological, aesthetic and ethical" components as well as economic components. 3 6 The paper suggests that "[riesources that are free or underpriced tend to be abused" or overused.3 7
Rights-based measures could create rights to use environmental
resources or to pollute the environment up to a predetermined limit.
These rights could be traded with others. 38 No differentiation was made
in the discussion paper between private and communal property rights.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

ESD, supra note 12.
Id. at 13-14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 15.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

Where it proved impossible to prescribe a monetary value to environmental damage, the discussion paper suggests direct governmental regulation
may be required, although this is less preferred than market mecha39

nisms.

The federal government's reliance upon market-based measures,
such as taxes, market incentives, and assignment of property rights in natural resources, illustrates the extent to which the Australian government
perceives that environmental change and economic dynamics are inextricably entwined. The use of economic terms has become a phenomenon of
Australian government and politics to an extent that would have been
unthinkable even 15 years ago. This use of the vocabulary of economics is
a key feature in the policy approach to environmental regulation in pursuit of sustainable development.
The incorporation of indirect social costs, or externalities, in product-costs adopts the social accounting of contemporary utilitarian economics; the twentieth century response to Benthamite utilitarian
philosophy.40 In the twentieth century, original nineteenth century utilitarian terminology has been replaced by new economic terms, such as the
cost-benefit analysis in commodity pricing. 4 1 The weighing of costs
against benefits has been used to ascertain the most economic, or efficient,
way of mobilizing existing resources in a way that appears to exclude
moral and philosophical considerations.
Australia is not alone in adopting this social accounting approach
to policy objectives. The emergent democratic and egalitarian governments of this century have been attracted to the seemingly impartial rationality of the utilitarian model. 42 These governments express concern for
both individual and collective welfare. The utilitarian model requires recognition of social interests defined as collective interests, although it is an
individualistic philosophy in that it counts the welfare of each individual
in order to ascertain the collective welfare.
Contemporary government intervention and regulation seek to
serve general welfare by operating efficiently and rationally.43 Cost benefit analysis and the welfare economic theories of Marshall, Pareto and
Pigou share the same roots.44 Under the cost-benefit equation, harm to
39. Id. at 16.
40. J. Bentham, The Principles and Morals of Legislation (1788).
41. The most simplistic economic model for cost benefit analysis is called the Kaldor-Hicks
criteria, which requires that the monetary benefits of a policy should not exceed its costs. See
generally D.W. Pearce, Environmental Economics (1976).
42. Sagoff, supra note 17. Sagoff points out that the proponents of the market approach
have not been able to show why efficiency is a social value in the first place. He questions
whether preference satisfaction ascertained on the "willingness to pay" principle has a justified place in the formation of public policy. Id.
43. For an argument that legal rights under utilitarian theory are antithetical to moral
rights, see David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in Theories of Rights Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
44. A. Marshall, Principles of Economics (1890), C.A. Dyon, Wealth & Welfare (1912); Vilfredo M. Pareto, Manual of Political Economy (latest translation 1970).
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society is measured by the costs of decline in overall economic welfare.
Pigou's scheme internalizes external costs so as to restore social optimality. Environmental problems are defined as external diseconomics that
drive a wedge between social costs and benefits and private costs and benefits. Theoretically, by putting a market price on resource use, the government should be able to directly change patterns of resource use.
"Rationality" is defined as a state in which each individual or
group is activated only by self interest. 4 5 Marshall explained human
behavior in terms of a perfectly competitive market. Such a market will
gravitate towards "natural equilibrium" as each person values the utility
of a commodity by the price they are prepared to pay for it.4 6 The extension of the theories of Marshall, Pareto and Pigou to account for environmental problems has put environmental aspirations within the
framework of rational economic man who seeks only to increase his own
net happiness. Monetary measures thus form the world view of environmental policy makers within this model.
Price-based measures have been a standard form of environmental control by governments in Europe and the United States for at least a
decade. As an accepted means of government control, price-based measures have as an established bureaucratic formulae for policymakers to
implement.47 Price-based measures follow the Pigouvian tradition, which
suggests that a market failure represents the existence of an externality
where the absence of a true market price has worked to block the attainment of Pareto optimality.4 8 Where there is no naturally occurring market
mechanism that automatically acts to place a price upon resource use or
resource pollution, a government can fill this gap by imposing environmental taxes and other charges. The proponents of tax and charge-based
mechanisms argue that the use of price-based measures will induce organizations and firms to innovate. Technical progress reduces the firm's
costs and ultimately reduces the costs of environmental and resource use
to society.49 Thus, classical price theory in which diminishing supply
leads to increased demand for alternative commodities in order to achieve
market equilibrium appears to have been assumed by the authors of the
government's discussion papers.
The assumptions about human behavior which underlie the economic model of environmental taxes and charges is that an individual's
reactions and choices can be reliably predicted upon the basis of informa45. F. Edgworth, Mathematical Psychics (1881).
46. Marshall, supranote 44.
47. See generally V. Kerry, Environmental Policy under Reagan's Executive Order (1984)
and Environmental Policy in a Market Economy (F. Dietz and W. Heijman eds., Pudoc
Wageningan 1988).
48. In a state of Pareto optimality, the welfare of one individual cannot be improved without harming the welfare of at least one other individual. See Pareto, supra note 44.
49. F. Majone, Standard Setting and the Theory of Institutional Choice: The Case of Pollution
Control,4 Policy and Politics (1976).
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tion that is available to that choice-maker. If people have information that
an environmental tax will increase the costs of certain behavior, people
will, it is assumed, reliably choose to adopt the least expensive option. To
be fully effective under this model, the initial height of a charge or tax will
depend upon the expected reactions of resource users and will need to be
adjusted to react to real behavioral outcomes. To be fully effective, taxes
and other monetary incentives and/or penalties that encourage avoidance
of environmentally damaging activity need to be set at a rate higher than
the costs of investing in other capital expenditure. If environmental penalties are set at a lower rate, a firm may prefer to pay taxes on pollution and
resource consumption and use, rather than lose an opportunity to invest
in other capital equipment that will increase the cost of production.
Coase suggested that the transaction costs incurred by government intervention in the market, whether directly or indirectly, may cause
the costs of ensuring that an activity is not environmentally damaging to
exceed the actual monetary cost of the damage caused.5 0 Coase suggests
that transaction costs, such as litigation, the costs of identifying and quantifying resource use, and the costs inevitably incurred in the framing of
and ultimate enforcement of property rights, may impose a burden upon
use of a resource so as to make the entire procedure inefficient, no matter
who bears the legal right or obligation in each case. Under the Coaseian
model, the most economically efficient outcome is that no legal rights
should be assigned to resource use. 51 That is, it may be preferable not to
regulate resource use, as the costs of regulation to preserve or conserve
resources may itself cost more than the worth of the resource. Putting the
difficult aspect of valuing environmental resources in monetary terms to
one side, Coase has firmly established the importance of law and economics as concomitant partners in this theory.52 The tremendous importance
placed upon economic models by policymakers explains the almost exclusive use of economic vocabulary in contemporary responses by policymakers to environmental concerns.
As with a system of price-based mechanisms, a system of rightsbased measures seeks to incorporate social costs within the market price
of commodities that carry environmental consequences. At the same time,
the rights-based system examines who owns resources and who is entitled
to charge for their use. The discussion paper's suggestion goes no further
than stating a belief that rights-based measures will inculcate a sense of
responsibility in the proprietor of a particular resource. This sense of
50. R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Journal of Law and Economics, (1960).
51. A.M. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law & Economics 13 (1989); R. Malloy, Law and
Economics, 334-37 (1990).

52. For a history of the effect of the Coase theorum upon law and economics, see D. Posin,

The Cbase Theorem: If Pigs Could Fly, 37 Wayne Law Review, 89 (1990). Posin also contends that
the Coase theorem is "wrong as a matter of straight forward micro economic theory" Id. at 93.
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responsibility is assumed to be an immutable quality that is uniform
among property holders, universally consistent and susceptible to change
only when there is a more economically efficient alternative to property
ownership. While not specifically addressed, the paper is premised upon
the assumption that a proprietary interest in property will automatically
increase the efficiency of property or resource use by the resource holder
to the level demanded by sustainable development. The Australian discussion paper relies upon ego-centered concerns as the goal of individuals, where the primary motive is personal monetary gain. The
predictability of this behavioral response of individuals to produce results
which are collectively
beneficial is assumed and unchallenged by the
53
paper's authors.
The orthodox economic argument for attaining efficiency through
property rights has three necessary conditions: universal ownership of
scarce resources, exclusive propert rights in remaining resources and
transferable property private rights. Transferability is important because
it allows the property holder to capitalize upon expenditures in her or his
property sale or transfer of the right. The property rights literature regards
well-defined private property rights as more efficient than communal
property rights, as these rights provide the best incentives for individuals
to make the best use of their resources. 55 Calabresi and Coase have placed
emphasis upon the way in which economic agents can be influenced by
market or economic incentives, and both emphasize the economic choice
theory of rational economic man acting within an ideal market. 56 As in the
case of price-based mechanisms, the premise of rights-based measures is
that individuals are motivated most profoundly, if not exclusively, by selfinterest and profit. Therefore, the best way of ensuring the continuing,
efficient use of land is to give an interest in it which can be sold, traded or
transferred. However, existence of free riders to resources that cannot be
appropriated, such as air and water, provides another justification for
state regulation of such goods. 57 Thus, even law and economics theorists
must at least acquiesce to the environmentalist argument that market
forces and public choice do not necessarily bring about sustainable devel58
opment.
The extension of economic paradigms based on the rational
choice theory to address environmental degradation has created a new
53. Milton, supra note 19.
54. F.Stephen, The Economics of the Law (1988).
55. G. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons in Ethics and Population, M.D. Bayles.
56. G. Calabresi & A. D. Melamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View
of the Cathedral,85 Harvard Law Review, 1089 (1972); R. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
Journal of Law and Economics, (1) (1960).
57. Lyons supra note 43.
58. M. Redclift, Economic Models and Environmental Values in Sustainable Environmental Management 53 (Economic and Social Research Council ed, Pinter Publishers 1988).
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field of economics. Bioeconomics is a growing sub-specialty of economics.59 The belief in individual motivation is fundamental to the Australian
federal government's preference for market-based measures in forming its
sustainable development strategy: "... . rights [ensure] that users have an
incentive 60
to consider the longer term and to manage those resources sustainable."
The same behavioral assumptions are made about the effect of
price-based measures under a system of pollution rights, where a permissible level of pollution is assessed by government and rights to pollute up
to this amount are sold on the market. Those needing to discharge pollutants seek to buy the rights. The cost of the right is determined by market
forces, i.e., the individual institutional cost of pollution discharge and
total market limits on, or capacity to sustain, pollution discharge. Presumably, those who have high costs of pollution abatement will more avidly
seek pollution rights. Those who can economically process their pollution
via their own technical initiatives would 6presumably
choose to do so to
1
avoid the costs of buying pollution rights.
The alternative aspects that may influence resource use, such as
tradition and custom, advertising and fashion, have little or no bearing
upon the theory of economic charges for resources. The use of the perfect
market, inhabited by perfectly rational economic man, means that interest, aspiration, altruism and desire are assigned a single monetary value.
This economic theory does not examine the connection between the
charge or tax and the belief system of the resource user. This theory fails to
recognize that the motivation of people and firms may include other commitments, such as contract obligations to pay off recently purchased
equipment or to promote union lead work practices and so on. Arguably,
these seemingly noneconomic considerations may prevent a decisionmaker from making a rational or efficient decision in order to either consume less of the resource that is being taxed or, alternatively, to innovate
so as to increase resource productivity from the same level of resource
consumption.
Recent empirical investigations into the results of environmental
charges have shown that environmental charges do not necessarily prevent environmental misuse. 62 This result is unsurprising given that the
success of market-based approach depends on only one form of behavior
-the single-minded pursuit of profit. Furthermore, while market measures may encourage resource use that is more sustainable than previ59. D. Pearce, Inaugural Lecture, University College, London, 1985, D. Pearce, A. Markandya & E. Barbier, Blueprint for a Green Economy (Earth Scan Publications, 1989); D.
Pearce &R. Turner, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990).
60. ESD, supra note 12 at 15.
61. For a fully argued case of a system of pollution rights see J.Dales, Pollution, Property
and Prices (1968).
62. Incentives for Environmental Protection T. Schelling.
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ously, there is no guarantee that resource use will become sufficiently
sustainable. It begs the question of a definition of sustainable development that ensures ecologically sustainable development to seek a precondition of economically sustainable development. The mathematical
approach to individual motivations in the economizing of environmental
regulation confirms the ". . .frequently caricatured picture of homo econ63
omis as an omniscient, infinitely calculating, egotistical maximizer."
The heavy dependence upon the vocabulary of economics in the
context of environment regulation reflects concern about the economic
times during which sustainable development is being debated. This
debate carries within it several opposing dimensions. The fashion in Australia in the late 1980s and early 1990s has been to describe all manner of
political concerns in the economist's jargon of efficiency and market failure. The impetus for econo-speak has come from the economic rationalists
who point to the (undefined) utopian days of deregulation. The economic
rationalists have captured the political ground not only of the Right, but
also the Left, as the boom-bust nature of the Australian economy over the
last 15 years has given way to long-term economic downturn.
Traditional Keynesian orthodoxies that provided a normative
rationale for direct government intervention and regulation in the past are
now under close scrutiny and question. The present drive for deregulation
is deeply influenced by factors that have been at the heart of the public's
perception of the role of government since the beginning of the recession
in Australia from the late 1980s. The combination of monetarism and supply-side incentive effects in industry that are part of economic rationalism's armory have played a large role in recent policy implementation.
Classical liberal philosophy which defines freedom within the relationship of the individual and government, assumes that the market is a central force in the lives of individuals. Classical liberal philosophy therefore
assumes that the market forms the normative conditions for legitimate
government intervention.
More recently, policy has been guided by neoliberal liberals who
see an active market as the only means of guaranteeing traditional negative political liberties. 64 The ideal market supposedly allows for efficient
resource exchange within a system that protects the paramount freedoms
of freedom of choice and private property rights. Even so, the libertarian
branch of liberalism sees cost-benefit analysis as a stalking horse for
unwarranted government intervention. 6 5 Notwithstanding that selfequilibrating markets remains a theoretical rather than practical reality,
63. A. Hamlin, Ethics, Economics & the State (Wheat Sheaf Books, 1986).
64. For a full discussion of this aspect of the U.K. and U.S. political values of the 1980s, see
G. Thompson, The Political Economy of the New Right (Pinter Publishers, London, 1990).
The neo-liberal position of the New Right has its Australian equivalent in the Liberal/Coalition "think tank", the Institute for Public Policy.
65. T. Machan, Pollution and Political Theory in T. Regan, Earthbound: New Introductory
Essays in Environmental Ethics 98 (1979).
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the mixed economy of Britain during the 1980s and "Reaganomics" during the same period in the United States saw market solutions as an ideal,
to be supplemented by social welfare solutions only in cases of overwhelming market failure. The weighing of costs against benefits was used
to ascertain the most efficient and most economical way of mobilizing
existing resources. The need for market correction by government in particular instances reinforced the paradigm of the market as a self-regulating
entity rather than as the explanation of exchange in capitalist systems that
it is.
The interest by Western governments in the 1980s to incorporate
the language of economics into the language of politics has supported the
use of cost-benefit analysis in solving environmental issues. Environmental concerns have been pitched into the resurgent faith in laissez-faire market values. Because the calculus is economic, prima facie moral and
philosophical considerations are excluded. The so-called neutrality of economic equations is far from impartial, though. The calculus is a valueladen process. It assumes that individuals wish to make their environmental choices through the market process, rather than the political process. It
assumes that individuals consent to any of the outcomes that result from
either the actual free market economy, or the pseudo-free market (government-created) economy.6 6 Thus, government is defining "sustainable
development" more in terms of present political and economic conditions
in which it exists, rather than in terms of the ecological circumstances
which acted as its catalyst.
The Australian government's discussion paper on ecologically
sustainable development suggests that economic growth and environmental objectives are mutually reinforcing. The government sees preexisting market mechanisms, together with government designated property rights and government-set environmental standards through the use
of monetary incentives, as the solution to environmental problems that are
themselves the product of inefficiently operating markets. In other words,
the papers authors take the view that if the ephemeral perfect market were
facilitated by a government that saw its proper place as the umpire, rather
than a participant, in the market, environmental problems would cease to
be problematic. 67 Self-interested individuals, the authors assume, would
prefer to act in ways that are universally and collectively beneficial, provided that they have appropriate economic rules to guide them. The
umpire's role, it is suggested, is merely to identify the necessary boundaries for fair use of resources by setting standards for resource use. The
66. See Coleman, Ethics and the Law: a CriticalReview of the Formulationsof the Economic
Approach to Law 94 Ethics 649, 671-77 (1984) cited in Sagoff, supra note 17 at 277.
67. For a persuasive argument upon the "market" as a theoretical fabrication, see J.Goldring, The Common Law and the FreeMarket: Some Reflections on the Use of TheoreticalModels and
the Place of Externalities,12 Bulletin of the Australian Society of Legal Philosophy 147 (1988).
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Australian federal government thus defines its role as one of setting the
standards for appropriate use of the environment. This use of market measures is inextricably linked with a government approach of managed capitalism that (paradoxically) seeks also to pursue a deregulated export and
import market.68 The object of deregulating the import-export market is
held up by government as a means of ensuring competition parity with
other international markets and, the discussion paper suggests, provides
the link with ecological sustainability. 69 The extended cost-benefit analy-

sis scheme of accounting for social and aesthetic environmental factors,
together with property rights of purchased environmental use,
presup70
solutions.
environmental
of
locus
the
as
place
market
the
pose
The adoption of a definition of sustainable development based on
market theory by an Australian Labour federal government whose political agenda favors equity is at first sight puzzling. But this tension is a measure of the robustness with which political forces have been influenced to
set the policy agenda to include the virtues of competition. Policy-makers
perceive that preference for procedural change, rather than direct substantive regulation, to protect the environment is a compromise between the
opposing forces of environmentalism and developmentalism.
The Australian government is attempting to formulate a policy on
sustainable development that will satisfy its general policy objective of deregulation but by means that necessarily involve substantial market intervention. Environmental conservation and preservation in the form suggested must ultimately be enforced by central control mechanisms, albeit
under the guise of indirect regulation that is comfortingly phrased in market-place vocabulary. While economic instruments of market-based measures designed to ensure positive environmental outcomes may
themselves require legislative backing,7 1 the government unquestionably
preferred indirect environmental regulation over direct regulatory mechanisms. The government's preference arises from its perception that market-based measures provide a "continuing incentive" to resource-users to
identify and adopt more efficient ways of obtaining a given environmental standard or in spurring efforts to achieve "progressively better standards." 72 Of course, direct legislative regulation, backed with the usual
68. ESD, supra note 12.

69. Id.
70. Cost-benefit analysis and the market model have been attacked on grounds other than
its lack of evidence of support by citizens as a justification for government regulation. It has
been suggested that the "preparedness to pay" principle is too ambiguous as there is an
unpredictable disparity between people's preparedness to pay on the one hand and their
willingness to sell on the other. This disparity points up the value-laden nature of cost benefit
analysis. See D. Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique,33 Stanford
Law Review 387 (1981).
71. ESD, supra note 12.
72. Id. at 14.
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coercive mechanisms of legal sanctions such as penalties, may be just as
"continuing" an incentive as indirect measures. The unspoken, but nevertheless clear, direction of the authors of the discussion paper was to pursue the political policy approach of deregulation that has been a feature of
United Kingdom 73 and American Governments' 74 approach during the
1980s. De-regulation is increasingly a feature of Australian federal politics.
Quite apart from the issue of whether government intervention in
environmental regulation when dressed in market-place vocabulary is in
fact any less an attack on individual liberty and choice than direct legislative regulation, the tension remains between the Australian government's
drive for deregulation and market mechanisms in its environmental strategy and its emphasis in the discussion paper of the fundamental place of
social equality as its political goal. This tension can to some extent be
resolved by understanding that social equity within the welfare economics paradigm also incorporates
the belief in markets as a naturally occur75
ring self-regulating entity.
The nexus between neoclassical welfare economics and the market lies in the way in which maximizing aggregate happiness justifies government intervention. Government intervention in the market is
legitimized if it seeks to improve the ability of individuals to make their
own choices. By defining efficiency within the rational choice model,
economists assume that a free market will ensure the collective ideal of
social equity. Because the aggregate good equals the social good, society
favors individual behavior that seeks to improve individual happiness
because that behavior incidentally increases the aggregate good. Policy
makers and society can justify government intervention to correct market
failure because efficient allocation of resources achieved by government
still preserves the desirable qualities of the free market.
PART IV CAN COHERENCE ARISE FROM CONTINUAL
BALANCING, OR MUST A CHOICE BE MADE?
Whether environmental regulation takes the form of direct controls or indirect controls in the form of incentives to resource users, the fact
remains that those controls are set by government. Market mechanisms
must be regulated to the extent required to ensure that broader social costs
are included in commodity prices. The so-called natural equilibrium of the
market has not managed to achieve this goal as part of its natural force yet.
As demonstrated earlier, sustainable development requires assistance and
intervention from an external force to avoid the free rider problems. The
73. G. Thompson, The Political Economy of the New Right (Pinter Publishers, 1990).
74. Kerry supra note 47.
75. Goldring supranote 67.

Summer 19921

SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INAUSTRALIA

paradox of such a situation is that imposition of external, institutionalized
market operations cannot, by definition, be a deregulated resources market. 76 To place the values of collective welfare in monetarist vocabulary
pre-supposes the "valuation" of environmental "assets" by government
and policymakers. Government-led and enforced alteration of environmental practices that ostensibly has its genesis in collectivist notions of
aggregate good cannot be effectively contained within the laissez faire terminology of "the market" cannot alter the interventionist nature of subsequent government action. It has been said of that the classical liberal
celebration of the market and its roots in freedom of the individual and
laissez faire:
"[t]he most profound delusion gripping contemporary
liberals and rationalists is the idea that firm opposition
to a politics of the common good can be sustained
without inviting the regimentation and repression to
which they are militantly opposed." 77
Implicated in the preference for the market and private property
rights is the normative view that the proper role of government is to
merely set rules. Financial incentives are assumed to motivate individuals
and it is also assumed that individual wealth-maximization is the single
most compelling activator of people's actions. The values of prosperity
and economic growth for both individuals and governments are paramount, however. Thus the Australian federal government's use of the
term ecologically sustainable development maintains the fiction of the
market as a self-equilibriating entity. The term also maintains conceptually the link between private property, market capitalism and economic
growth that has dominated modem economic theory.
The justification discussed above for using market-oriented policy tools and property rights solutions to address environmental problems
places protagonists of these market-based approaches in opposition to
policies of direct regulatory mechanisms. These protagonists are joined by
those who prefer a de-regulated economy, but on different groundsnamely, individual liberty, rather than market efficiency. The underlying
value systems of these who base their views on liberty interests need to be
identified to assess the value of such "freedom."
In its most extreme form, the economic approach to environmental regulation is a component of a libertarian style of government. The proponents of either the "efficiency" or "liberty" models of government
regulation describe a society in which the individual's self-interest can be
predicted and is quantifiable. Some have said that ". . . labor market
76. Contrast L. Chipman, Liberty, Justice and the Market (Centre for Independent Studies,
Occasional Papers (6) 1987).
77. W. Connolly, Appearance and Reality in Politics (1981).
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reform, tax reform, monetary discipline and a smaller role for government
in enterprises and regulation are the real key to future prosperity", 78 for
governments that apply a "command and control" approach of government ownership of property and provision of services are incapable of
anything other than incompetent, overly bureaucratic and inefficient ser-

vices. 79 The view that institutions are inherently unable to pursue the
espoused goal of the institution incorporates the public choice theory of
Tulloch and Buchanan. 80 In other words, because individuals are motivated primarily by self-interest, their primary interest as workers in an
institution is to re-enforce the role of the institution and thus ensure each
individual's own continued existence within it.8 1 The public choice
approach to government intervention has added to the neo-liberals' suspicion of government to the point that neo-liberals consider a results-oriented approach unjustified except in those cases where the argument for
government intervention is overwhelming.
The arguments of the neo-liberal and public choice theorists'
against government ownership and control of environmental resources
rests upon perceptions of institutionalized objectives that reflect political
and institutional goals. Similarly, economic rationalists seek to justify their
view by espousing the objective and empirically provable existence of
"the market." Common to all views is the belief that social order obtains
better when government is small. Environmental standards that achieve
true efficiency and provide individuals with the opportunity to freely
exercise the full range of economic choices will present themselves, they
would argue, when government does not intervene in their lives. These
views are fueled by the dread of governmental coercion and the ghost of
popularized views of anti-democratic societies. These anxieties are no
doubt further kindled by the political manifestos of some of the European
environmental political parties which emphasize the equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. Nothing could lie in greater contraposition to the neo-liberal view than the political ideology of the
German die Griinen party. The argument for a market driven approach to
environmental regulation is described with ominous emotion by pointing
to the extreme environmental damage that has occurred in Communist
countries. 82 But pointing to environmental damage in countries which
place collective social and economic concerns ahead of individual wealth
is an incomplete argument. It must be remembered that Marxist ideology
78. Markets, Resources & the Environment (A. Moran, A. Chisholm & M. Porter eds.,
1991).
79. Id.at Chap. 2.
80. J.Buchanan & G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1965).
81. Contrast Hamlin and the games theory (the "Prisoners' Dilemma") he demonstrates in
Hamlin, supranote 62.
82. A. Moran, supranote 78 at 29.
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is driven just as much by economic imperatives as Western liberal ideology. In Western countries, private ownership of resources has been the
operative system while significant and not infrequently irreversible environmental damage has occurred to farming lands, riverways, seabeds,
atmospheric conditions and mining sites. While it may well be true that
government and bureaucracy-run services within the Marxist political
model do not overtly benefit the environment, that is not in itself an argument for the beneficial effects of private ownership. Instead, it is a persuasive argument to develop a new, co-operative model of environmental
concern. Under a new determinative model, power would be taken out of
the hands of both governments and propertied individuals and placed in
the care of the community.
In Australia, the Resource Assessment Commission legislation is
paradigmatic of the seemingly unavoidable incongruity of the aspirational goals of legislation and the practical means of implementing those
goals, when the goals and means are placed side-by-side as equal considerations. Instead, the exercise becomes one of attempting to balance
"equity" with "efficiency." Despite the deployment of the cost-benefit
analysis approach of utilitarianism, the Resource Assessment Commission is required to also identify aesthetic values that the legislation itself
recognizes as unquantifiable. 8 3 The practical difficulty in equitably reconciling different goals is clearly demonstrated in the Resource Assessment
Commission's 1991 Report into the Kakadu Conservation Zone.84 In this
report, the Commission considered the proposal to mine minerals at Coronation Hill in the Northern Territory of Australia. The Kakadu Conservation Zone is surrounded by, but not part of, Kakadu National Park, some
200 kilometers east of Darwin in the Northern Territory of Australia. The
Conservation Zone is 47.5 square kilometers of Commonwealth Crown
land proclaimed as a Conservation Zone under federal legislation. 85 The
area is the home to a group of Australian Aboriginals, the Jawoyn, who
regard the area as a sacred site. The Resource Assessment Commission
was charged with inquiring into the use of resources in the Conservation
Zone and considering the area's environmental and cultural values, the
impact of potential mining operations on those values, the national economic significance of mining and how mining would affect the interests of
the Aboriginal people.
In its Report, the Commission recognized the spiritual and cultural significance of the area to the Jawoyn people and made reference to
the aesthetic values which the Commission is bound to consider within
83. Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989 (Cth)ss.88(c)(i) and (ii) and (d)(i) and (ii).
84. Kakadu Conservation Zone Inquiry Final Report (Australian Government Printing
Service 1991).
85. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act, No. 12 (1975) (Commonwealth of Australia).
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the policy principles annexed to the federal legislation that created the
Resource Assessment Commission in 1989.86 Balancing the economic benefit of mining and tourism against the less easily quantifiable benefits to
Australians of leaving the area unmined was difficult enough. However,
the Commission's greatest difficulty lay in how it ought to balance the
wholly economically quantifiable benefits to the local Aboriginal population to leave intact an area that has for them important spiritual values.
The Resource Assessment Commission was unable to do more than infer
that the balancing of economic with non-economic values made for a difficult political decision. 87 The Commission emphasized the black humor
of the Report of the WCED when the WCED had said in 1987 "[that] sustainable development must rest upon political will."88
When projected to the international situation the issues remain
the same. The ultimate meaning given to an environmental right to sustainable development within the human rights vocabulary suggested by
the WCED will unavoidably be effected by the economic circumstances
into which it is introduced. However, to consider only economic considerations would be to overlook the moral content of the use of the term "environmental right" in the Brundtland Report. An international treaty
framing an environmental right as a fundamental human right seeks to do
more than ensure national and international efficiency of resource-use,
both human and biological. Unless the term "fundamental human right"
is to be overlooked as being merely exhortative, it must be seen to represent not merely the economic concerns of the international89community,
but also the moral concerns of the international community.
The international human rights movement is essentially a postWorld War II phenomenon that owes much to Marxist-influenced socialism. Paradoxically, at a time when Marxist-led political ideologies have
been crumbling in Europe, the role of the United Nations as a representative of international moral feeling has gained enormous momentum in the
face of international conflicts and their aftermath.90 A more subtle distinc86. See infra note 21.
87. Draft Report of the Inquiry into the Kakadu Conservation Zone, (Australian Government Printing Service and Final Report, 1991). The Final Report, released in April 1991, abandoned the contingent valuation survey conducted to assess the monetary value that people
place on the preservation of an area for their intrinsic satisfaction that the area remain undespoiled by human activities. The Resource Assessment Commission received wide-ranging
criticism about their use of the contingent valuation method, ranging from, inter alia, concerns that survey respondents were exhibiting a "moral free lunch" to concerns that the survey methodology was flawed. Kakadu Conservation Zone Inquiry Final Report, pp.148-152
and Appendix Q.
88. See infra notes 2, 9.
89. Sagoff supra note 17. The general thrust of Sagoff's argument is further developed in
M. Sagoff, The Economy of the Earth (1988).
90. N. Bustelo & P. Alston, Whose New World Order: What Role for the United Nations?
(Sydney, The Federation Press, 1991).
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tion between the approach to resource use within the Western capitalist
model and within the Marxist model is apparent when one looks at the
underlying values of the model. Neo-classical economics has attempted to
incorporate environmental values by use of externalities. The Marxist
approach to the environment is affected by the fundamental issue that is at
the heart of Marxist thought, i.e., the distribution of resources and the consequences of that distribution on economic growth. 91 The problem for the
environment within classical Marxist ideology is that resource scarcity
will only cease when it is no longer necessary to make commodities to
produce profit. Thus, it can be seen that both classical Western economic
theory and classical Marxist theory in undiluted form necessarily envisage continued use of resources. 92 Neither model is equipped to provide a
justification for the cessation of resource use if that is what an ecologically
sympathetic application of sustainable development calls for.
International treaties for civil, social and economic rights attempt
to set standards for laws of social policy that have their genesis in moral
value. United Nations Charters written in human rights vocabulary stress
the normative, rather than analytic, nature of laws. International human
rights vocabulary is driven by morals, not markets. Human rights vocabulary describes the moral values which a moral society seeks to apply for
the benefit not only of individuals in that community
but also for the sake
93
of the community as an integrated whole.
While this author concedes that this approach carries a certain
moral and cultural arrogance, it is nevertheless an entirely different
approach to the purely economic justification for laws of social policy. The
economic approach sees people as bundles of preferences which market
regulation can satisfy. The goals of efficiency on the one hand and the
moral objectives of policy and regulations on the other hand are clearly
different. This difference is not to deny the validity of either, but to underscore their different places in the regulatory process. An international
human right to sustainable development has its basis not only in concerns
of gross domestic product, material standards of living and appropriate
prices for rainforest timber. It arises more fundamentally out of international moral aspirations that seek to emphasize the inter-dependency of
each national community upon the other.
91. M. Redclift, Economic Models and Environmental Values: A Discourse on Theory in
Sustainable Environmental Management (1988).
92, Id. at 61. Redclift also argues that Marxist method, with some revision of its nineteenth
century contextual assumptions, has a relevant place in formulating an environmental ideology. Id.
93. I leave aside the argument of the relative strengths and weaknesses of an environmental right directed at the individual, but which the World Commission Report envisages to be
a duty of the State to provide. See International Colloquium, An Individual Right or an Obligation of the State? International Colloquim on the Right to a Human Environment (E.
Schmidt, Berlin, 1976).
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Given the socialist-driven genesis of post-1945 United Nations
international Covenants, it is surprising that the WCED's Report empha"sizes economic growth to such an extent. It is unclear if this emphasis necessarily entails economic growth within the capitalist model of
transferring nature and adding value to natural resources within a market
system.94 Indeed, the WCED's Report's stress upon reducing poverty in
developing countries seems to suggest a return to the values of non-capitalistic societies. These societies incorporated environmental values into
their cultural theology. These values were more predisposed95 to sustainable development than those of post-industrialism efficiency.
There is no doubt of the practical difficulties that lie between the
moral aspirations expressed in the WCED Report and actualization of the
goals of a clean, healthy environment that ensures sustainable development for this and future generations. On the face of it, internationally recognized human rights seem to call for ideal, distributive justice.9 The
fundamental human right framed by the WCED suggests the right of
every person to a clean and healthy environment and the substance of the
Brundtland Report demonstrates that sustainable development is an integral feature of this right. Prima facie, this would require a powerful centralized government that would be able either to ensure distribution of
resources or the capacity to direct and control the economic system and
thus become the provider of the right for everyone if this right were to be
operationalized within existing political paradigms. Indeed, if the
WCED's ultimate goal of "ensuring equitable opportunities for everyone"
were to be extended to its fullest operational point, a lowering of the standard of living in the more affluent nations would be required.9 7
There can be no doubt that an international analysis of environmental effects points to an imbalance of economic growth in developing
countries relative to developed countries in relation to resource use. The
Second Draft of "Caring for the World", a joint publication of the World
Conservation Union, the United Nations Environment Programme and
the World Wildlife Fund for Nature released in June 1990 cited "inequitable distribution of power and of access to information and resources,
within and among nations" as one of the three main obstacles to be overcome to achieve sustainability" 98 That Draft Report considered that sus94. WCED, supra note 2 at 9.
95. Redclift supra, note 91 at 64.
96. H. Uibopuu, The Internationally Guaranteed Right of an Individual to a Clean Environment in Human Rights in the World Community, 151,155 (Richard P. Claude & Bums H.
Weston eds., 1989); A. Eide, supra note 102, at 43 pointing out that "Approaches to human
rights are profoundly influenced by ideological controversies, not the least concerning the
role to be played by the state."
97. Eide supra note 102 at 15.
98. World Conservation Union, United Nations Environment Programme and the World
Wide Fund for Nature, Caring for the World: A Strategy for Sustainability (Second Draft, June

1990).
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tainable development was dependent upon a principle, inter alia, of
"aim[ing] for an equitable distribution of the benefits and the costs of
resource use among... countries." 99 The difficulties and dangers to other
individual and collective freedoms considered integral to Western capitalist nations, which place such a hiagh premium upon individual right to
accumulate capital, are obvious.l' U Furthermore, there can be no doubt
that a strong central government brings its own moral and practical problems that are addressed only in part by the suspicions of the public choice
theorists. How then should Australia respond to an obligation to undertake institutional and legal changes to promote an environmental right if it
were to become a party to the proposed international treaty for a human
right to a clean, healthy environment and/or a right to sustainable development?
The difficulty faced in translating any international treaty obligation into national obligations is the wide and necessarily abstract terms of
legal rights under international law. Their imperfection lies in a language
that endeavors to encompass the whole range of international behavior
that could be relevant to a legal right under international law. The
WCED's recommendations are expressed in the broadest of terms. An
environmental right framed as a fundamental human right would demonstrate the same phenomenon of broad expression obvious in the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights
and the European Covenant on Economic,
10 1
Social and Cultural Rights.
The call to each country that became party to such a treaty to enact
implementing laws actualizing an environmental right stops far short of
providing a program of implementation. Simple prohibitions on environmentally-damaging behavior do not constitute a full program of implementation. Doubtless, the wide ambit of the proposed environmental
right is a necessary recognition of the many and varied conditions that
apply in different countries. Climatic and geographic differences as well
as political and economic differences among different countries must have
a role to play in dictating the final form of local environmental regulation.
Each country and each culture has its own subjective standard that it will
apply to words such as "clean" and "healthy" and "sustainable." The
WCED clearly envisages sustainable development as a flexible concept
that will be defined differently within each nation state according to the

99. Id. at 4. The Report went on to note that: "The most obvious disparity is between high
income communities, whose members use large amounts of energy and raw materials, and

low income communities, whose per capita resource consumption is modest. Because of
wasteful and excessive consumption, high income communities often degrade the environments of other communities as well as their own." Id.
at 8.
100. Eide supra note 102.

101. Id.
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physical, economic and political circumstances into which it is introduced. 10 2
Given the difficulties of an international standard that specifically
requires governments to ensure sustainable development, it would be
easy to relegate an "environmental right" to the status of a purely exhortative preference for an ideal which is, practically-speaking, unachievable.
The WCED's policy prescriptions in "Our Common Future" are vague.
Faced with the uncertainty of moral goals, it may seem safer to revert to
the cost-benefit analysis approach for justifying environmental regulation
upon purely economic considerations. The language of politics is increasingly spoken of as economic obligation rather than moral aspiration.
"Hard" scientific data and money-in/money-out graphs are reassuring
when compared to the struggle inherent in assessing the parameters of a
better environment within a framework of social justice.
To dismiss the moral claims of an environmental right (and, by
analogy, any argument for environmental protection that is not based
upon economic formulae) would amount to a dismissal of the concerns
that have been at the very heart of the environmental movement. These
concerns derive from the inherent lack of moral sensibility in the uses of
resources that result in a departure from what some environmentalists
have described as the naturally-occurring order of "Nature."1 °3 The environmental movement has at the center of its theoretical constructs an
assumption that there is a system in nature, which when left to cycle
within the web of life, will achieve a balance and that this balance will
allow continued viability of nature. The "invisible hand of the market" is
replaced by the "invisible hand of nature." The curious aspect about this
value system-and it is a value system-is that it is also based upon the
empiricism and scientism that is fundamental to the economic value systems.
The economic approach uses the guideline of "efficiency" to arbitrate the distinction between unregulated individual activity and permissible state intervention. Perfectly rational neo-classical man is motivated
by maximizing egoism and the economic approach suggests that this
motivation can be described in monetary terms. The environmental
approach uses the guideline of ecological efficiency to arbitrate the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable levels of human interven102. A solution to the dilemma of translating theory into practical in relation to international treaty obligations of social and economic rights is to apply the "Minimum Threshhold
Approach." See A. Eide, Realization of Social and Economic Rights and the Minimum Threshold
Approach, 10 Human Rights Law journal 35, (1989).
103. This position is taken by the "deep ecologists" who adopt a biocentric view of human
activity with other living beings and processes. See A. Naess, The Shallow and the Deep, LongRange Ecology Movement, 16 Inquiry (1973); Deep Ecology (M. Tobias ed., 1984).
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tion. While these approaches appear on the surface to be different, both
the economic approach and the equity approach are based upon an acceptance that humans and nature need to live in a better state of symbiosis.
10 4
Both approaches assume a naturally occurring "state of grace",
whether it be the market or the forces of Nature. Both require the filtering
of empirical data, nested within the procedural proscriptions of scientific
rationalism.
Where does this leave an environmental right and the sustainable
development that the WCED suggests, ought to be established if more
than one generation is to have the advantage of the right? If a principled
moral aspiration is the catalyst for environmental regulation, it is logical
that economic and other constraints (technological, climatic, et cetera)
should dictate the approach to achieving the goal of regulation. The
WCED clearly considered that the goals of economic growth and environmental quality could be joined through the co-operative efforts of governments and industry.
Moral values guide us in determining whether an environmental
objective ought to be implemented and the economic values help to assess
the extent to which those objectives can be implemented. The sequential
ordering of the two dimensions is critical, for it is only in this way that the
broad moral concern is enjoined to take into account the practical capacity
of government, individuals and groups to fulfill environmental objectives.
To make the maximum practical level of implementation act as the yardstick against which the reality is measured does not deny the place of
morality in the equation. The economic dimension plays its part in assessing and gauging the extent and timeframe within which environmental
objectives can practically be reached. While not denying economic criteria,
it is important to recognize its sequential place after the moral values that
have acted as the impetus for environmental regulation.

CONCLUSION
The Australian federal government's discussion paper on economically sustainable development is a syncretic response to the WCED's
suggestions and proposals. Despite the government's attempt to combine
different values and principles, the practicalities of sustainable development still lack a coherent basis. The government explicitly rejects direct
regulation as a means for influencing environmentally appropriate behav104. 1have adopted here a term used by Posin. Supra note 52. Note also that view of nature
as naturally symbiotic if left undisturbed has been like all scientific and quasi-scientific paradigms, displaced by a view based on the chaos theory, ie., nature is constantly recovering
from distabilizing forces.
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ior except in circumstances where it is impossible to fit a given resource
into a price or property model. In so doing, the government has overlooked the indispensable role that direct regulation has had in both utilitarianism and liberalism. The neo-liberal fear of government is setting the
environmental agenda in a profoundly influential way. The definition of
sustainable development is rendered further elusive and obstruse by the
WCED's use of distributive justice. Both the Australian Resource Assessment Commission and the Australian federal government's discussion
paper on ecologically sustainable development attempt to incorporate the
concept of distributive justice into policy by requiring government to use
broader subjective
criteria than the immediately and empirically ascer105
tainable.
Government (through both policy and legislation) is searching for
philosophical values that go beyond the cost-benefit utilitarian approach
of the economic model and the deregulatory neo-liberal model. This political and legal system has fallen shy of tackling that task. Distributive justice plays only a small part in the approach of the government, but
distributive justice is integral to the human rights vocabulary of the environmental right to sustainable development suggested by the WCED's
Report. Policymakers must go beyond bioeconomics when framing legal
mechanisms of environmental regulation. Australian policy makers must
look at the underlying value systems that were the catalyst of political
interest and subsequent government regulation. Most importantly, policymakers must come to grips with the synergy of the vocabulary of law, policy and social concern. Australian policymakers must take the economic
vocabulary they have used to describe sustainable development and
develop the terms of the national government's sustainable developments
objectives through the multiple lenses of social equity

105. The Commonwealths 1990 Discussion Paper stated "most people also have aesthetic
and ethical reasons for wanting to see plants and animals survive." ESD, supra note 12 at 3.

